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Indirect Effects of a Policy Altering Criminal Behavior: 
Evidence from the Italian Prison Experiment1 
By Francesco Drago and Roberto Galbiati* 
We exploit the 2006 Italian prison pardon to evaluate peer effects in 
criminal behavior. The pardon randomly commutes actual sentences 
to expected sentences for 40 percent of the Italian prison population. 
Using prison and geographical origin to construct reference groups 
for former inmates, we find large indirect effects of this policy. In 
particular, we find that the reduction in the individuals 
' recidivism 
due to an increase in their peers 
' residual sentence is at least as large 
as their response to an increase in their own residual sentence. From 
this result we estimate a social multiplier in crime of two. ( JEL D 12, 
K42, Z 13) 
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of primary importance in the design of effective policies to prevent crime (Manski 
1993; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996). Anecdotal evidence and casual 
empiricism suggest that peer effects exist and are important with regard to criminal 
activity. However, well-known identification issues and inherent difficulties in run- 
ning randomized experiments for relevant criminal policy variables make empirical 
evidence on peer effects quite difficult o produce. 
In this paper, we use the July 2006 Italian (natural) prison experiment in order 
to study the indirect effects of a policy which dramatically changed incentives to 
commit a crime and to evaluate whether criminal activity is subject to peer effects. 
The Italian prison experiment occured with the Collective Clemency Bill, which 
was passed by the Italian Parliament in July 2006 and provided an immediate 3-year 
reduction in detention for all inmates who had committed a crime before May 2, 
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2006. Upon approval of the bill, almost 22,000 inmates were released from Italian 
prisons. Of direct importance to the objective of this study, the bill stipulates that if 
a former inmate commits another crime within 5 years of their release from prison, 
they will be required to serve the residual sentence suspended by the pardon (vary- 
ing from 1 to 36 months) in addition to the sentence for the new crime. In other 
words, the policy effectively transforms one month of an original sentence into an 
additional one month of sentence for future crimes committed at the individual level. 
Our main variable of interest is the residual sentence at date of release, which 
varies at the individual level. Conditional on inmates' original sentences, variation 
in the residual sentence (and hence in the expected sentence for a future crime) 
depends only on the date of an inmate's entry into prison, which is plausibly exoge- 
nous.1 As reported by Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009), former inmates' residual 
sentences at date of release represent an incentive which effectively decreases the 
propensity to reoffend. 
As a first step, we explore whether former inmates' decisions to reoffend are influ- 
enced by the residual sentences of those inmates with whom they are most likely 
to be in contact. More specifically, we define reference groups for foreign inmates, 
based on prison and nationality (40 percent of the sample is of foreign origin); and 
Italians, based on prison and region of residence. Inmates released from the same 
prison who are also of identical geographical origin are thus placed in the same 
group. The central underlying idea driving this analysis is that inmates who served 
time together will tend to interact outside prison once they are released. In this case, 
peer effects may occur for a variety of reasons (e.g., imitation or complementarities 
in criminal activities), leading to the following basic prediction, the incentive (the 
residual sentence) to an individual to reoffend will influence not only his behavior 
but also the behavior of other members of his group. 
We find empirical support for this prediction. Peers' residual sentences greatly 
impact individual recidivism. The estimated impact of the average residual sentence 
of the group (excluding the individual himself) is comparable to the direct effect 
of the individual residual sentence. In particular, an average residual sentence of 
one additional month decreases the probability of being rearrested by 0.16 percent- 
age points.2 The considerable size of the indirect effects is consistent with a social 
multiplier of two in crime. In other words, individual-level shocks to criminal activ- 
ity were amplified by social interactions by a factor of two for the population of 
released inmates following the bill. A plausible mechanism underlying this effect 
is the maintenance of prison peer groups after release and the presence of comple- 
mentarities in post-release behavior (e.g., joint crime production). Sociological and 
qualitative research on prison gangs (Skarbek 2010; Leeson and Skarbeck 2010; 
Fleisher and Decker 2001) and on former Italian inmates' post-release networks 
(Baccaro and Mosconi 2004; Santoro and Tucci 2006) supports this interpretation. 
Moreover, an examination of the date of entry into prison and inmates' province of 
1 In support of this hypothesis, we find evidence that conditional on original sentence length, inmates' observ- 
able characteristics are balanced for individuals below and above the median of the remaining sentence. 
In order toexamine the appropriateness of using eographical origin a d prison to identify peer groups, we exper- 
imented with several different falsification ests in which we constructed peer groups according to randomly generated 
prisons or nationality and region-based identifiers. In allcases the indirect ffects ofthe policy are ssentially zero. 
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residence allows us to obtain additional results using alternative definitions of peer 
groups, providing further evidence consistent with this mechanism. 
This paper contributes to the literature on peer effects and crime. In particular, our 
identification strategy builds on the Italian prison experiment by providing exogenous 
individual level variation in incentives to recidivate. This key feature allows us to 
create exogenous variation in group level incentives even in the presence of endog- 
enously formed peer groups. Few studies to date contribute to the identification and 
measurement of this phenomenon. Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2009), for exam- 
ple, exploit the exogenous assignment of individuals to peer groups. They find that 
inmates build criminal capital behind bars that increases post-release criminal activity. 
Using aggregate data, Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) and Ludwig and 
Kling (2007) find positive peer effects in criminal behavior but only for less serious 
crimes. One limitation to the existing literature is that it is not always possible to dis- 
criminate between endogenous and exogenous social interactions. This distinction is, 
however, crucial given that endogenous interactions are generated by the contagious 
behavior of peers, while exogenous interactions are generated by the characteristics of 
peers influencing individual behavior (Manski 1993). A policy that alters individual 
criminal behavior will have indirect effects only in the presence of endogenous social 
interactions. This paper sheds light on these types of interactions and the ways they 
represent an important determinant of criminal activity. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections I and II, we describe the institu- 
tional setting and the identification strategy. We present the data in Section III, our 
results in Section IV, and a discussion of the mechanism in Section V, followed by 
our conclusions in the final section. 
I. The Italian Prison Experiment 
In what follows, we briefly describe the motivations and the provisions detailed in 
the collective pardon law approved by the Italian Parliament in July 2006. 3 
Due to substantial overcrowding in prison facilities,4 the Italian Parliament passed 
a collective pardon on July 30, 2006 (Law 241/2006), a legislative measure consid- 
ered to be of exceptional nature. According to the Italian Constitution, any law pro- 
viding for the implementation of amnesty or collective pardon must be approved by 
both Chambers of Parliament with a majority of two-thirds in favor of each article of 
the law (Section II, Art. 79 of the Italian Constitution). These conditions are identi- 
cal to those required for approval of a constitutional reform (Art. 138). 
The bill grants a reduction in the length of detention for those who committed a 
crime before May 2, 2006. The backdating of the collective pardon, announced imme- 
diately after the Parliament began to debate the bill, rules out any possible effect of 
the collective pardon on crime rates during the months leading up to the approval 
of the law. The ruling reduces prison sentences by three years for a large number of 
3See Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) for amore detailed description of the Italian criminal justice system 
and additional background concerning the design and approval of the collective cl mency bill. 
By the nd of the 1990s, the average overcrowding ratio in Italian prisons was 131 inmates for every 100 
prison places. 
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inmates, but does not entirely ignore the offense. More specifically, on August 1, 2006, 
all those with a residual prison sentence of less than three years were immediately 
released from residential facilities. However, a number of criminal acts are excluded 
from the collective pardon, in particular those related to the mafia, terrorism, armed 
gangs, mass murder, destruction and ransacking, usury, felony, sex crimes (in particu- 
lar against juveniles), kidnapping, and the exploitation of prostitution. 
The bill's provisions with regard to the reduction of incarceration length foresee 
that an inmate convicted of a crime (other than those listed above) committed before 
May 2, 2006 is eligible for immediate release from prison as long as his residual 
sentence is less than three years. As a result, the prison population dropped from a 
total of 60,710 individuals on July 31, 2006 to 38,847 on August 1, 2006. 
As far as our research question is concerned, the crucial consequence of the bill 
is the variation in prison sentences at the individual level. The bill declares that all 
those who recommit a crime within five years of July 31, 2006 and who receive 
a further sentence greater than two years lose their right to clemency. This means 
that within the five-year period following their release from prison, former inmates 
granted collective pardon face an additional expected sanction equal to the residual 
sentence pardoned by the bill. Take for instance two criminals convicted of the same 
crime who both had a residual sentence of less than three years on August 1, 2006. 
They are then both released from prison on August 1, 2006. Suppose that the first 
individual entered prison one year before the second individual and thus has a par- 
doned sentence of one year, while the second individual has a pardoned residual 
sentence of two years. Over the following five years, for any crime category, they 
face a difference in expected sentence of one year. For example, for a robbery with 
an expected sentence of 10 years, the first individual would be sentenced to 1 1 years 
in prison (10 years for the robbery plus 1 year residual sentence pardoned by the 
Collective Clemency Bill), while the second individual would be sentenced to 12 
years (10 years plus 2 years of residual sentence). 
II. Empirical Strategy and Identification 
In this section, we present our empirical strategy. Let yijk denote the post-release 
outcome of individual i of nationality к (region of residence if Italian) who served 
his former sentence in prison j ( yijk takes value 1 if the individual was rearrested ur- 
ing the period under consideration, and 0 otherwise). As we explain in further detail 
in the next section, prison and nationality (region of residence for Italians) define 
the reference group. Moreover, let s entres ijk and sentence ijh respectively, denote an 
individual's residual sentence (pardoned) and original sentence.5 The basic regres- 
sion model used in this paper is thus 
(1) У ijk - ßo + ß' sentenceijk + ß2sentresijk + ß3 avgsentence^_^jk 
+ ß4avgsentres{_i)jk + Х[]кф + avgX'{_i)jkip + eijh 
5 Throughout the analysis both the original sentence and the residual sentence and their averages are expressed 
in months. 
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where avg sent res. hjk and avg sentence, lijk are individual-level variables, or the 
average residual sentence and the average original sentence for the group of indi- 
viduals of nationality (region of residence for Italians) к in prison j, excluding indi- 
vidual i, respectively. In other words, avg sentres( represents individual ť s peers' 
average residual sentence, which, as a result of the design of the collective pardon 
is potentially part of individual V s peers' incentive to recidivate. With Xljk we denote 
a set of individual-level control variables and with avgX(_ljjk their averages in the 
group, excluding individual i. Given that in the basic regression model we condi- 
tion on individual original sentence, individual residual sentence, and average origi- 
nal sentence, variation in the variable of interest (average peers' residual sentence) 
is obtained from groups of inmates who entered prison during the same span of 
months but have different original sentences or who entered during different months 
but have the same original sentences. 
The estimated coefficient of interest is ß4, or the response of individual i to an addi- 
tional month in the average residual sentence of his group, i.e., the indirect response 
to the policy. The coefficient ß2 is the direct response to the conversion of one month 
of original sentence into one month of expected sentence for individual i. It is worth 
remarking that unlike other papers, such as that by Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen 
(2009), where the interest lies in understanding the effect of peers' characteristics on 
individual behavior, our focus here is on peers' incentives rather than peers' charac- 
teristics. Consequently, our framework of analysis does not require us to assume that 
selection of individuals into groups (and hence also in a given prison) is random. 
Rather, the assumption needed is that peers' residual sentences are orthogonal to 
individual and peer characteristics. Hence, in order to obtain a consistent estimate of 
ß4, the conditional independence assumption is that once we control for individual 
sentence, residual sentence and average sentence, the average residual sentence is 
orthogonal to unobservables. Namely, the assumption is cov ( avgsentres ,e | sentence, 
sentres, avgsentence) = 0. Although we cannot directly test this hypothesis, in the 
next section, we provide evidence consistent with the latter based on different tests 
on observables. 
III. Data, Peer Groups, and Evidence for the Identification Assumption 
A. Individual-Level Data 
Data for this study come from an internal database maintained by the Italian 
Department of Prison Administration (DAP) on offenders under its supervision. We 
were granted access to DAP records on all individuals released as a result of the col- 
lective pardon law between August 1, 2006 and February 28, 2007. The full sample 
includes 25,813 individuals, 81 percent of whom were released on August 1, 2006. 
For each individual, we have information on whether or not the ex-inmate reoffended 
between the date of release from prison and February 28, 2007. This means that for 
most of the sample, the available data report recidivism for the first seven months 
following release from prison. Moreover, the data contain information concerning a 
wide range of variables at the individual and facility level. The following information 
is reported for each individual: facility where the sentence was served, official length 
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of the sentence, actual time served, kind of crime committed (i.e., most recent offense 
in an individual's criminal history before the pardon), age, sex, level of education, 
marital status, nationality, province of residence, and employment status before being 
sentenced to prison. As data on successive convictions are not available, we use subse- 
quent criminal charge and imprisonment as our measure of recidivism. 
Our analysis is restricted to those individuals serving their sentence in prison, i.e., 
we exclude individuals carrying out their terms in a penal mental hospital (98 indi- 
viduals). Moreover, we exclude any individual with a residual sentence greater than 
36 months. This occurs in the case of individuals who have accrued several different 
charges and are serving their sentence for at least one, while awaiting verdicts on oth- 
ers. We also do not consider individuals for whom sentence data are missing. Because 
we preferred to conduct the empirical analysis with a homogenous sample both in 
terms of date of release and period of observation (7 months), we exclude individuals 
with a residual sentence equal to 36 months. While we do not know the exact date of 
release of each inmate, we do know that any inmate released after August 1, 2006 nec- 
essarily had a residual sentence of 36 months. The final sample used in the empirical 
investigation is made up of 20,950 individual-level observations. 
B. Reference Groups 
Using the individual-level data, we construct reference groups using inmates from 
the same facility with identical nationalities. Italians are instead grouped by region and 
facility.6 With this procedure, we obtain 1,778 groups with more than one individual. 
The large number of groups derives from the fact that there are many inmates serv- 
ing their sentence in a jurisdiction different from that of their hometown for reasons 
ranging from overcrowding in the closest prison to the Italian Prison Administration's 
view that a certain facility is incompatible with the inmate (see Drago, Galbiati, and 
Vertova 201 1). The average size of the group is 10.59 (SD = 28.12), for Italians it is 
18.06 (SD - 43.38), and for foreigners it is 5.91 (SD = 7.18). 
The underlying assumption is that speaking the same language and sharing similar 
characteristics and values are factors that facilitate interaction, especially in an iso- 
lated environment, such as prison. In fact, Italians from the same region are very likely 
to share similar values and cultural backgrounds (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
2008). Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) and Aizer and Cunie (2004) use 
language as the defining characteristic of reference groups in their study of welfare 
use participation. In our study, we feel it is more appropriate to adopt nationality as 
the defining feature of a group. In fact, Italy is a country of very recent immigration, 
making it likely that non-Italian speakers have only recently arrived. In addition, the 
literature on migration (Boyd 1989) shows that it is common for recent immigrants 
to create and maintain strong ties with people of the same nationality in their new 
destination country. In addition, using language as the reference variable to construct 
groups would mean including, for example, Mozambicans and Brazilians in the same 
6 Note that women a d men belong to distinct groups given that they always carry out heir sentences in different 
prisons or in separate branches of the same prison. See Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (201 ) for adescription of the 
characteristics of the facilities n our sample. 
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Table 1 - Individual Characteristics for Average Residual Sentences Above and Below the Median 
Whole 
sample, Average Average individuals peers' peers' 
belonging to residual residual 
groups with sentence sentence Whole at least two below the above the 
sample individuals median median Difference OLS OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Other g oup members' average 38.697 38.336 39.046 -0.709 
original sentence (in months) (0.121) (0.153) (0.187) (0.739) 
Other g oup members' average 14.474 12.409 16.470 -4.061 residual sentence (in months) (0.032) (0.035) (0.045) (0.249) 
Individual recidivism 0.115 0.117 0.123 0.112 0.011 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Individual original sentence 38.982 38.681 39.20 38.18 0.990 
(in months) (0.225) (0.235) (0.334) (0.330) (1.213) 
Individual residual sentence 14.511 14.471 14.834 14.121 0.710 
(in months) (0.070) (0.073) (0.105) (0.102) (0.664) 
Age on exit 38.764 38.734 38.574 38.889 -0.303 0.070 0.087 
(0.069) (0.073) (0.109) (0.109) (0.326) (0.030) (0.030) 
Married 0.284 0.286 0.294 0.279 0.014 0.000 0.000 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) 
Permanently mployed 0.339 0.341 0.337 0.345 -0.008 0.001 0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.0162) (0.002) (0.002) 
Percentage of males 0.954 0.962 0.976 0.948 0.029 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of Italians 0.621 0.657 0.645 0.669 0.024 0.009 0.009 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.004) (0.003) 
Area of Residence: 
North 0.425 0.415 0.416 0.415 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.047) (0.004) (0.004) 
Center 0.185 0.179 0.147 0.21 -0.064 0.004 0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.042) (0.003) (0.003) 
South 0.378 0.395 0.431 0.36 0.070 0.000 0.000 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.004) (0.004) 
( Continued ) 
category. Relative to nationality, this would be a noisier proxy for identifying cultural 
and contextual differences. In light of these considerations, in Section IV, we explore 
how our results change when the definition of the reference group is modified. 
C. Summary Statistics and Evidence for the Identification Assumption 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the entire original sample (column 1) and 
for individuals belonging to groups with more than one inmate, which we exploit 
to estimate the basic regression model (column 2). The table reports the results of 
several tests, providing evidence consistent with our identifying assumption. Our 
empirical strategy is based on the assumption that peers' residual sentences are 
orthogonal to unobservables once we condition on peers' original sentences (and 
individual original and residual sentences). This is equivalent to saying that once we 
fix individual /'s original and residual sentence, and the average original sentence of 
his peers, the average residual sentence determined by his peers' date of entry into 
prison is as good as random. 
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Table 1 - Individual Characteristics for Average Residual Sentences Above and Below the Median 
(Continued) 
Whole 
sample, Average Average individuals peers' peers' 
belonging to residual residual 
groups with sentence sentence Whole at least two below the above the 
sample individuals median median Difference OLS OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Education: 
Compulsory 0.901 0.909 0.916 0.903 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
High School 0.079 0.074 0.067 0.081 -0.013 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
College (Degree or quivalent) 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kind of offense: 
Drug Offenses 0.404 0.401 0.403 0.398 0.005 0.004 0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) 
Crime against Property 0.412 0.417 0.412 0.421 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
Violent Crimes 0.095 0.095 0.098 0.092 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Immigration bill 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Crime against Public Safety 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gun Law 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 20,950 18,872 
Notes: Standard e rors in parentheses. Robust standard e rors in columns 5, 6, 7 clustered by group indicator. C lumn 1 reports sum- 
mary statistics for the whole sample calculated. Column 3 reports summary statistics for those observations where the average peers' residual sentence is b low the median for that original sentence length, and column 4 reports summary statistics for those observations where the average peers' residual sentence is above the median for that original sentence length. Column 5 reports the point estimates of the differences between themeans incolumns 3 and 4. Column 6 reports coefficients on average peers' residual sentences from regres- 
sions with individual level observables as dependent variables controlling for average peers' original sentence. Column 7 reports coef- ficients on average peers' residual sentences from regressions with individual level observables as dependent variables controlling for 
average peers' original sentence, individual residual sentence, andoriginal sentences. 
As a first step, in columns 3-4 of Table 1, we report the averages of the observed 
characteristics for those observations where the average residual sentence of those 
sharing the same reference group is either above or below the median for that average 
original sentence length.7 In column 5, differences in the means are reported. This 
is equivalent to a test of observables being balanced for individuals with an average 
residual sentence below and above the median, conditional on the original sentence. 
This test is nonparametric in that it tests the equality of means between two groups 
without imposing any assumption on the relationship between observables and aver- 
age residual sentence. As shown in column 5, in nearly all cases there is no significant 
relationship between the demographic variables and the average residual sentences. 
The few point estimates that are statistically different from zero reveal extremely small 
7 As average original sentence is acontinuous variable, for each individual observation, we condition on the closest 
higher integer ( .g., for average roup original sentences b tween o e and two months, wecondition on the value two, 
for average roup original sentences b tween two and three months, wecondition on the value three, etc.). 
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differences and fall well below 5 percent of the standard deviation from the mean. 
These results support the idea that the average residual sentence of a group is a variable 
uncorrected to unobservables once we condition on the average original sentence. 
In column 6, we perform the same test, but we impose a parametric structure, pre- 
senting the point estimates of the OLS regressions of each individual characteristic on 
average residual sentence and average original sentence. In column 7, we present the 
estimate of the same OLS regression conditioning on individual original and residual 
sentences. Compared to the previous test, the OLS weighting scheme tends to overes- 
timate some differences in observables between individuals with low and high average 
residual sentences.8 There are in fact many reasons why the results of a nonparamet- 
ric test may differ from the results of a linear regression, including the distribution of 
regressors and the degree of heterogeneity in the relationship of interest (Yitzhaki 1986, 
and Angrist and Kruger 1999). For the sake of completeness, we report the results from 
the linear regressions, although we argue that the most informative results are gained 
from the first est reported in columns 3-5. Our treatment variable is continuous, and 
the key assumption is that the treatment is caused by random fluctuations in peers' 
dates of entry into prison. The most transparent and practical way to provide support for 
this assumption is to show that the observables are balanced without imposing a linear 
relationship between the latter and the date of entry into prison.9 
IV. Results and Discussion 
A. Results 
Before presenting the regression results, in Figure 1, we report individuals' 
responses to both their expected sentences and their peers' expected sentences. 
Figure 1 A reports the recidivism rate for each original sentence for former inmates 
with residual sentences both above and below the median for that original sentence 
length. Each point on the figure corresponds to the original sentence, the x-axis is 
recidivism rate for below median residual sentence and the y-axis is recidivism for 
above median residual sentence.10 The recidivism rate for individuals with residual 
sentences above the median is systematically lower for each original sentence (most 
points are to the right of the 45-degree line). Thus, the figure provides graphical rep- 
resentation of the direct effect of residual sentence on individual recidivism. Figure 
IB reports recidivism rates for former inmates whose peers' residual sentences are 
above and below the median, conditional on peers' original sentence.11 The emerg- 
ing picture is one of higher recidivism for former inmates whose peers' expected 
sentences are lower than the median, conditional on peers' original sentence. 
8 Although in this case as well, the few point estimates hat are precisely estimated arevery small. 9 In fact, when we regress, as in column 6,the fraction f Italians on average residual sentence and average 
original sentence, weask if, conditioning o  average original sentence, an increasing fraction of Italians' peers enter 
prison earlier o  later than foreigners. This is a test of whether a monotonie relationship exists between the date of 
entry in prison and the share of Italians over the ntire ange of dates of entry into prison. 
We report only those groups whose sentences range between 20and 50 months, the range characterizing the 
majority of the individuals. 1 1 As the average original sentence is,in this case, a continuous variable, for each individual observation, we 
condition o  the closest higher integer. 
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Figure 1.Direct and Indirect Effect of Residual Sentence on Recidivism 
A. Recidivism conditional onindividual original sentence 
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Table 2 - Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Individual residual sentence -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 
(-6.00) (-6.35) (-6.36) (-6.25) 
Average p ers' residual sentence -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0015 
(-3.16) (-2.45) (-2.51) (-2.22) 
Individual original sentence -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
(-1.19) (3.27) (3.29) (3.27) 
Average p ers' original sentence 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.33) (-0.14) (-0.48) (-0.60) 
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Average p ers' characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Individual type of crime No Yes Yes Yes 
Peers' averages of type of crime No No Yes Yes 
Prison fixed effects No No No Yes 
R2 0.004 0.021 0.024 0.038 
Number ofgroups 1,778 1,769 1,666 1,666 
Observations 18,836 17,399 17,296 17,296 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual 
returned to prison after release and zero therwise. Robust i-statistics in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the group level. Individual v riables include education levels, age at 
date of release, a dummy indicating marital status, nationality, employment condition before 
imprisonment, and geographical area of residence. Values of average roups' characterisitics 
are constructed starting from the individual v ues of the same variables. 
Table 2 reports the baseline results of variations in model (1). Standard errors are 
clustered at the group level. In the first column, we present the results of a speci- 
fication of the model that includes only individual original sentence ( sentence ijk), 
average original sentence of the group excluding the individual i {sentence 
individual residual sentence ( sentresijk ), and average residual sentence of the group 
excluding individual i ( avgsentres^_i)jk ). The coefficient ß2 is negative and precisely 
estimated; an additional month of residual sentence decreases the probability of 
recidivism by 0.16 percentage points. The coefficient ßA on average residual sen- 
tence is also negative and precisely estimated. It appears that the average effect 
of peers' residual sentence is at least as important as individual residual sentence. 
The results suggest that a 1 month increase in an inmate's peers' residual sentence 
decreases the probability of recidivism by 0.20 percentage points. In columns 2-3, 
we include a set of individual characteristics: age, sex, nationality, education, marital 
status, employment dummy, and type of crime committed before release for both the 
individual (column 2) and for other group members (column 3). We do not observe 
statistically significant differences between the various specifications, although the 
indirect effects in columns 2 and 3 are slightly smaller. 
Although the potential nonrandom selection of groups of inmates into prisons 
is not an issue, we still include prison fixed effects in our specification.12 These 
fixed effects control for any nonrandom selection of inmates into prison and for any 
12 If average r sidual sentence is orthogonal to group characteristics, then itshould also be orthogonal to prison 
characteristics, which in turn can have an effect on recidivism after release (Chen and Shapiro 2007; and Drago, 
Galbiati, and Vertova 201 1). 
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fixed differences of prison affecting recidivism rates. Results from this specification 
are reported in column 4 and suggest that the effect of average residual sentence 
remains essentially unchanged. 
Overall, these results show large indirect effects of the policy commuting actual 
sentences into expected sentences. When considering the direct response of individ- 
uals to the policy, we observe approximately a 1.5 percent reduction in recidivism 
with an additional month in residual sentence. Considering the results in columns 
2 and 3, we have a 1.3 percent reduction in recidivism caused by indirect effects. 
Overall, an increase of 1 month for all individuals in a group corresponds to a reduc- 
tion in recidivism of about 2.8 percent. In the sections that follow, we further explore 
the heterogeneity of this estimated effect and provide evidence for interpreting the 
latter in terms of peer effects on crime. 
B. Heterogeneity 
In model (1), we assume that peers' residual sentence affects the individual recidi- 
vism of potential criminals in the same way. In Table 3, we report the results of more 
flexible linear probability models which allow the effect of peers' residual sentence to 
vary with individual original sentence, individual residual sentence, nationality (Italian 
or foreign), type of offense before release (drug and property offense), and size of the 
group. In columns 1 and 2, each row represents a different model, including the full set 
of controls. In column 1, we report the coefficient on the average residual sentence; and 
in column 2, we report the coefficient on the interaction term between average residual 
sentence and the variable identified in the row heading. It appears from column 2 that 
the data do not support heterogeneity. Most of the interaction terms are close to zero 
and are never precisely estimated. There is some indication that the effect of the aver- 
age residual sentence is larger for foreign inmates and for small groups of individuals, 
although the interaction terms are not statistically significant at conventional evels. 
In columns 3-4 of Table 3, we explore whether the estimated effects change with 
peers' characteristics. Peers' residual sentences have a greater effect on individual recid- 
ivism when peers' original sentences are shorter and when the crime category commit- 
ted before entering prison is a drug offence. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we explore 
another form of heterogeneity deriving from different definitions of peer groups. We 
maintain geographical origin and prison as group identifiers but add age (by quartiles) 
and crime committed before entering prison. In order to guarantee a reasonable number 
of groups, we combine Italians (thus excluding region of residence as an identifier) and 
foreigners (thus excluding nationality as an identifier). The use of diverse definitions of 
peer groups is informative with regard to the nature of peer interactions. More specifi- 
cally, when peer group is defined by age and crime committed, the estimated coefficient 
on peers' residual sentence is substantially smaller than that estimated above. That said, 
however, experimenting with different alternatives produces the same patterns. 
C. Falsification Tests 
In order to provide additional empirical support for the idea that the estimated 
indirect effects come from peer effects, we perform several falsification tests that 
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Table 3 - Heterogeneity 
Interaction Interaction 
of average of average 
Average residual Average residual 
residual sentence with residual sentence with 
sentence row variable sentence row variable 
 0)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No interaction -0.0016 - No interaction -0.00165 - 
(-2.52) (-2.52) 
Individual original -0.0018 0.00000 Peers' original sentence -0.0029 0.00003 
sentence (-1-92) (0.23) (-2.91) (1.85) 
Individual residual -0.0014 -0.00001 Peers' committing a drug -0.0006 -.00232 
sentence (-1-32) (-0.31) offense (-0.65) (-1.55) 
Dummy on Italians -0.0022 0.00147 Peers' committing a crime -0.0020 0.00107 
(-2.74) (1-25) against property (-2.40) (0.64) 
Drug offense -0.0013 -0.00072  
(-1.58) (-0.64) 
Crime against property -0.0019 0.00055 Peer groups 
(-2.47) (-0.47) Peer groups defined defined by type of Size of the group -0.0015 -0.00000 bv ase crime 
 (-2.31) (-0.60)  (5) (6) 
Dummy if group < = 6 -0.0026 0.00155 Individual residual -0.0017 -0.00165 
(-1.42) (0.82) sentence (-6.89) (-6.02) 
Dummy if 6 < -0.0026 0.00055 Average p ers' residual -0.0011 -0.00075 
group < = 26 (-1.42) (0.26) sentence (-1.37) (-1.00) 
Dummy if 26 < -0.0026 -0.00246 
group <- 80 (-1.42) (-0.84) R2 0.022 0.020 
Dummy if group > 80 -0.0026 - Number ofgroups 1,449 1,191 
(-1.42) Observations 19,094 18,006 
Notes: OLS estimates arereported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual returned to prison after 
release and zero therwise. Robust i-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the group level. All mod- els include the same controls used in column 3 of Table 2. 
randomly define reference groups within the same prison or of the same geographi- 
cal origin. There are 129 nationalities among the foreign inmates: 20 Italian regions 
of residence among the Italian inmates, and 199 prisons. As a first step, for each 
reference group defined by prison and nationality (region of residence for Italians), 
we randomly assign a number between 1 and 129 for foreign and Italian inmates. 
This number reflects the new identification umber of the "false" nationality. We 
then once again create reference groups defined by prison and (false) nationality. 
Using this procedure, we obtain randomly generated groups of inmates who served 
their sentence in the same prison. We now have groups made up of individuals of 
different nationalities as well as groups made up of both Italians and foreigners. In 
column 1 of Table 4, we report the results from the specification reported in column 
3 of Table 2. The number of observations is reduced given that this method produces 
more groups composed of only one inmate.13 The coefficient on average residual 
sentence is essentially zero and not statistically significant. 
13 When we experimented by randomly assigning less than 129 nationalities, and hence reduced the number of
groups composed of only one individual, we obtained very similar results. 
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Table 4 - Falsification Tests 
Regions (20) and Regions (20) and 
Nationalities (129) nationalities (129) nationalities (20) Prisons (199) 
randomly assigned randomly assigned randomly assigned randomly assigned 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Average p ers' 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0001 
residual sentence (0.10) (-0.77) (-0.14) (-0.20) 
R2 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.022 
Number ofgroups 3,184 3,056 2,430 2,709 
Observations 12,659 13,928 17,274 16,674 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual returned to prison after 
release and zero therwise. Robust ř-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are robust. The specifications adopted 
are the same as in column 3 of Table 2. See text for the procedure employed in constructing reference groups for 
these falsification ests. 
As a second step, we randomly generate a number between 1 and 20 (regions of 
residence) for each group of Italians. We do the same for foreign inmates, randomly 
generating a number between 1 and 129. We then once again create reference groups 
defined by prison and nationality for foreigners and prison and region of residence 
for Italians. Using this procedure, we obtain groups of inmates who served their sen- 
tence in the same prison, but unlike the previous falsification test, we allow Italians 
to belong only to groups of Italians (even if from different regions) and foreigners 
to belong only to groups of foreigners (even if of different nationalities). Column 
2 of Table 4 reports the results from the specification reported in column 3 of Table 
2. The coefficient on average residual sentence is very low compared to Table 2. In 
column 3 of Table 4, we carry out the same exercise, but randomly assign 20 nation- 
alities instead of 129, thereby increasing the number of observations and reducing 
the number of groups. In neither case do we find evidence of indirect effects. 
In another falsification test, we focus on the role of nationality by letting the pris- 
ons where inmates served their original sentences vary randomly. For each group of 
inmates, we randomly generate a number between 1 and 199 (the number of prisons 
in our sample). We then group inmates by nationality, or region of residence for 
Italians, and on the basis of this classification, randomly generate a prison identifi- 
cation number. Column 4 of Table 4 reports the results. The coefficient on average 
residual sentence is again close to zero. This test further supports our initial defini- 
tion of peer group by demonstrating that interaction among individuals of the same 
nationality is much stronger among those who carried out their original sentences 
in the same prison. 
D. Interpreting the Indirect Effects as Equilibrium Effects : 
a Social Multiplier of Crime 
A useful exercise to gauge the magnitude of the indirect effects with respect to 
other papers in the literature is to interpret our results in terms of a social mul- 
tiplier of crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2003). Regressing average 
recidivism on average residual sentence (without excluding individual /), we find 
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a coefficient on average residual sentence that is double that of the coefficient on 
individual residual sentence in the individual recidivism regression in which we 
regress individual recidivism on individual residual sentence. Under the assumption 
that an individual's peers' average residual sentence influences his/her recidivism 
only through the effect that average residual sentence has on his/her peers' recidi- 
vism, we observe a social multiplier of recidivism of about two. In other words, an 
exogenous shock decreases individual recidivism by 1 percent, implying a 2 percent 
reduction in aggregate recidivism in equilibrium. The same results come from Table 
2. If we could change every inmate's sentence by transforming one month of actual 
sentence into one month of expected sentence, we would obtain a result in equilib- 
rium double that of the direct effect. 
Although we are unable to compare this result with other findings in the literature 
on crime, we do observe that social multipliers equal or even greater than two and 
large indirect effects are present in the literature on other topics. For example, using 
a similar design to that employed here, Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) examine a cash 
subsidy encouraging school attendance, finding a social multiplier of two in school- 
ing decisions. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003) similarly report a social 
multiplier of about two in social group membership among students in Dartmouth 
College dorms. Duflo and Saez (2003) also find that social interactions played a 
prominent role in employees' decisions to enroll in a Tax Deferred Account (TDA) 
retirement plan in a large US university. Some (treated) employees in some (treated) 
departments received a letter of encouragement, an effective incentive to attend a 
benefits information fair. Within the treated departments, those who received the 
letter and those who did not were about as likely to subsequently enroll in the TDA. 
In all of these papers, as in our own work, the social forces that play a role in the 
decision to commit a crime, to attend school or to enroll in a retirement plan are at 
least as important as the direct costs and benefits experienced by individuals. 
V. Potential Mechanisms and Interpretation 
A. Time Served in Prison 
The results reported above are consistent with two main possible explanations: 
the effect of peers' residual sentences mirror the existence of complementarities 
in post-release criminal behavior, and/or (consistent with Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and 
Puzen' s 2009 findings) individuals are influenced by their peers because they served 
time together in prison.14 In fact, one month of residual sentence corresponds to an 
additional month in the expected sentence and one month less time served in prison, 
such that inmates who have peers with longer residual sentences also have peers 
with whom they served less time. Thus, the observed negative effect on individual 
recidivism could be due to the fact that an inmate served less time with his/her peers. 
For example, while in prison, inmates build criminal capital and this mechanism 
operates through social interactions. In what remains of this section, we consider 
14 See Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson (2009) for an in-depth discussion f the ffects ofprison experiences and time 
served incorrectional facilities. 
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the plausibility of a mechanism relating to time served, while in the next section, we 
discuss the second hypothesis, or that of complementarities in postrelease behavior. 
In order to fix the time of interaction in prison, we use reference groups composed 
of inmates who: entered prison during the same month; were released from the same 
facilities; and are of the same nationality (or region for Italians).15 Differences in 
individual residual sentences within a group are now derived only from differences 
in individual original sentences. However, because we fix the time served in each 
group, we cannot run a regression as in model (1) as individual residual sentence, 
individual original sentence, average original sentence, and average residual sen- 
tence would be collinear. To understand the effect of average residual sentence and 
get around the collinearity, we exclude average original sentence from the regres- 
sion model (1). In this case, the coefficient on average residual sentence captures 
the joint effect of average residual sentence and average original sentence (which 
is excluded). Note that longer average residual sentences are associated with longer 
average original sentences. If, therefore, we still find a negative coefficient on aver- 
age residual sentence, the latter should be a lower bound estimate of peers' residual 
sentences. The logic here is that the original sentence should capture the danger- 
ousness of an inmate. Hence, if peers' average original sentence has any effect on 
individual recidivism, this effect should be positive. 
Table 5 illustrates the results of this exercise. We observe a negative coefficient 
on average residual sentence between -0.0008 and -0.0010. This is lower than the 
coefficient in Table 2 but still reveals a sizeable effect of average residual sentence 
compared to individual residual sentence. Because our reference groups are con- 
structed in such a way that peers serve the same amount of time in prison, the effect 
on the key variable cannot be attributed to the fact that peers with longer residual 
sentences served less time in prison with any one inmate. The results in Table 5 sug- 
gest that the effect of average residual sentence develops primarily through peers' 
incentives after release. While we cannot exclude that interactions in prison play 
some role in the determination of the main results (Table 2), Table 5 indicates that 
interactions in prison (time served) are unlikely to drive these results and that a sub- 
stantial part of the effect develops through peers' incentives. 
B. Complementarities outside of Prison 
The second and preferred mechanism in line with our results consists of the notion 
that peer groups formed in prison remain the same after release, and thus peers' 
residual sentence will affect an individual's behavior due to behavioral spillovers. 
To clarify the mechanism that likely generates the results, it is useful to look at 
sociological and qualitative studies on prison, both in Italy and in the United States. 
In Italy, for example, Baccaro and Mosconi (2004) report the results of 85 inter- 
views conducted with inmates in the city of Padua's prison. Interviewed inmates are 
recidivists that have been imprisoned more than once. The authors show that prisoners' 
15 With this procedure, we obtain ot only groups of smaller average size but also many more groups (2,888) 
composed of few individuals (about three on average), with a total number of observations of le s than 10,000. Indeed, 
within i each prison facility, here are not many individuals of the same nationality who entered onthe same date. 
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Table 5 - Baseline Results with Reference Groups Defined Also by the Exact 
Month of Entry in Prison 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Individual residual -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0017 
sentence (-4.34) (-4.20) (-3.91) (-3.78) 
Average p ers' residual sentence -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0008 
(-1.86) (-2.19) (-2.06) (-1.60) 
Individual original sentence 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 
(1.37) (2.14) (1.58) (1.98) 
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Average p ers' characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Individual type of crime No Yes Yes Yes 
Peers' averages of type of crime No No Yes Yes 
Prison fixed effects No No No Yes 
R2 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.043 
Number ofgroups 2,888 2,849 2,652 2,652 
Observations 9,401 8,598 8,401 8,401 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual 
returned to prison after release and zero therwise. Robust ř-statistics in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the group level, where groups are defined by nationality (region if 
Italians), prison, and the xact month ofentry into prison. 
main networks outside of jail during their prior releases were made up of family mem- 
bers and former inmates. Santoro and Tucci (2006) analyze interviews with approxi- 
mately 140 former inmates from facilities in the Tuscan region. The authors explain 
that many of the interviewed subjects describe meeting their "best friends" among 
those with whom they did time. The literature on prison gangs in the United States 
similarly confirms that social links developed in prison are maintained upon release 
(Fleisher and Decker 2001). In order to endure life in jail many inmates join prison 
gangs, often formed on a racial or ethnic basis. Prison gang members are not only 
active inside prison but also remain in contact with other gang members following 
release, in line with one of the basic tenets governing gang members: "blood in, blood 
out" (Leeson and Skarbek 2010; and Skarbek 2010) or mandatory life membership. 
These cases show that ties formed in prison are maintained outside once inmates 
are released. As a consequence, the fact that peer effects have an impact on indi- 
vidual criminal behavior suggests the presence of complementarities in post-release 
criminal activities among peers. 
In order to provide evidence for this mechanism we need two types of groups, 
more or less identical with respect to the degree of interaction in prison but differ- 
ent with regard to the degree of interaction outside prison. Ideally, we would expect 
to observe larger indirect effects of peers' residual sentence for the group in which 
interactions outside of prison are likely to be stronger. 
More specifically, using inmates' province of residence, we create two types of 
groups. The first type is defined by nationality (region of residence for Italians), prison, 
and province of residence. When, for each prison and nationality (or region), we have 
inmates of different provinces of residence, we group these inmates together, creating 
the second type of group. For example, if there are four Moroccans serving time in a 
prison in Milan and two are from Rome, one is from Turin, and the other from Milan, 
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Table 6 - Baseline Results with Reference Groups Defined using the Province of Residence 
First type Second type First type Second type 
of groups of groups of groups of groups 
same province different province same province different province 
 0)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Individual residual sentence -0.0011 -0.0036 -0.0014 -0.0036 
(-4.21) (-5.25) (-4.65) (-4.85) 
Average p ers' residual -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0013 0.0004 
sentence (-2.88) (0.47) (-2.16) (0.52) 
Individual original sentence -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 
(-1.46) (0.10) (2.97) (0.75) 
Average p ers' original 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0004 
sentence (0.93) (-1.96) (-0.02) (-1-73) 
Individual characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Average p ers' characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Individual type of crime No No Yes Yes 
Peers' averages of type of No No Yes Yes 
crime 
R2 0.002 0.021 0.022 0.038 
Number ofgroups 2,024 925 1,877 851 
Observations 15,853 2,660 14,491 2,403 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual returned to prison after 
release and zero therwise. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the group level, where 
groups are defined by nationality (region if Italians), prison, and the xact month ofentry into prison. See text for 
the procedure employed in constructing reference groups. 
the inmates from Rome belong to the first group and the other two to the second group. 
An analysis of the first group shows indirect effects imilar to those observed using the 
entire sample (Table 6, column 1 and 3), while indirect effects for the second group of 
inmates are essentially zero (Table 6, column 2 and 4). 
16 Although the small sample 
size in columns 2 and 4 may arguably limit the precision of the results, taken together, 
the point estimates in Table 6 corroborate the mechanism. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have exploited a unique quasi-experimental dataset in order to 
document large externalities of a policy that manipulates individual incentives to reoff- 
end by commuting inmates' actual residual sentences into expected sentences. Our esti- 
mates suggest that the indirect effect of peers' average incentives not to commit a crime 
is at least as important as the direct effect of individual incentives to reoffend. These 
results show that peer effects tend to have a strong impact on criminal behavior, and are 
consistent with the hypothesis of complementarities in post-release criminal behavior. 
16 Note that hese results do not necessarily mean that using province of residence together with geographical 
origin and detention facility provide a better definition of peer groups. In fact, these results do not exclude the 
possibility that individuals in the second group actually respond to residual sanctions of individuals of the same 
nationality included ingroup 1. As shown i  Table 3, we find large indirect effects when peer group is not defined 
by province of residence. This indicates that i  is possible that individuals now in group 2 are part of the peer group 
defined by nationality and detention facility and are influenced by their peers, but when grouped together (ingroup 
2) they are not subject to peer influence, in line with the mechanism we favor. 
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In addition to building upon research on peer effects and crime, our study con- 
tributes to debate on the effectiveness of incarceration in reducing crime (Donohue 
and Siegleman 1998; Owens 2009; Barbarino and Mastrobuoni 2008; Buonanno et 
al. 2011) and, relatedly, policies which introduce alternatives to imprisonment (Di 
Telia and Schagrodsky 2009). In order to gauge the actual impact of such policies, 
quasi-experimental studies or randomized experiments should consider the potential 
of social interactions to amplify the impact of interventions. From a policy stand- 
point, law enforcement activities can have strong spillover effects through behav- 
ioral spillovers (as in this case) or through informational spillovers, as demonstrated 
in other studies. For example, in their studies on Austria, Rincke and Traxler (201 1) 
document large enforcement spillover of increasing the probability of detection of 
TV licence fees evaders. To this regard, these results add to the small but growing 
literature on the externalities of law enforcement activities. 
A final issue concerns the generalizability of these results. If our main explana- 
tory channel is complementarity in post-release criminal activities, external validity 
of the results depends on the possibility of future interactions. Given that the mas- 
sive release of inmates observed in the Italian prison experiment was an extraordi- 
nary provision, this seems limited. Post-release interactions among former inmates 
are in fact facilitated when they are released together. Nonetheless, findings in the 
sociological literature (reported above) suggest that former inmates do maintain 
relationships when they are released in different periods. Leaving prison at the same 
time, facilitates post-release contact, but it is not a necessary condition for observing 
complementarities in post-release criminal activity. That said, one must certainly 
take this issue into account when interpreting the results. 
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